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Delivering Services for The Urban Poor:
Government Organizations
versus
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)
by
MARIA D. L. R. RUIZ-CEPEDA
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 16, 1988 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Master Study in City Planning
ABSTRACT
This thesis is a comparative study of government and of non-
government interventions in the provision of services to the
urban poor. It poses the following questions: (1) what is the
division of labor between government and non-government
organizations (NGOs) in the delivering of services to the urban
poor? (2) in what kinds of interventions do NGOs perform better
than government organizations? (3) Why is that performance
better?
To answer the above questions, the author contrasts the
performance of two development projects for the provision of
services to the urban poor in the Dominican Republic, one
formulated and implemented by a government organization, and the
other by an NGO. This contrast focuses on first, the origin and
objectives of each project; second, on the extent to which the
beneficiaries participate and volunteer to work in all the
project's components; and third, on the performance of each
organization in achieving its stated objectives.
Although all these questions could not be answered within
the limits of this thesis, the findings of this study lead to the
two following conclusions: first, that when NGOs take
responsibility for providing large scale services, they
themselves might constrain their potential roles. This study
main findings revealed that the NGO's potential to address urban-
poverty projects was limited by: (i) overestimating its own
economic and technical capacity to resolve people's needs, (ii)
involving the organization in activities outside its field of
expertise, (iii) lacking an understanding of the required
mechanisms to implement development projects for the urban poor,
and (iv) losing its credibility with the people when it did not
accomplish its stated goals. The second conclusion showed that
in poverty-oriented project, participation is more forthcoming
and people are more likely to contribute their time for the
common good when they are granted benefits, in kind or in cash.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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To the young generation of people living
in squatter settlements in the
Dominican Republic.
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INTRODUCTION
One indicator of urban poverty in developing countries is
the growing proportion of people living in squatter settlements.
In these countries, squatters constituted about 40 percent of
urban residents in 1981 and this number will increase to almost
60 percent by the turn of the century (Sumka, 1987). Futhermore,
World Bank studies of Latin American and Caribbean countries
indicate that by the 1990s more than half of the poorest of the
poor will be concentrated in urban areas. Urban dwellers will
make up 90 percent of the very poor of those countries (Cheema,
1986). Although statistics forecast that the highest
proportion of poor in Latin American and Caribbean countries will
be concentrated in urban areas, the financial constraints of the
governments of these countries make clear that they are unable to
meet the demand for urban services to this population. In the
search for alternative solutions, recent literature on poverty-
oriented projects presents non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
as the current focus of hope. Since NGOs have an agenda for
poverty alleviation and evidence shows that these organizations
can carry out programs effectively, what might the roles of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) be in delivering services for
the urban poor?
Although there are several types of NGOs, this thesis
examines only those engaged in the delivering of urban services.
It poses the following questions: (1) what is the division of
labor between government and non-government organizations in
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delivering services for the urban poor? (2) in what kinds of
intervention do NGOs perform better than governmental
organizations? (3) why is that performance better?
Looking for answers to the above questions, I contrasted the
performance of two development projects for the provision of
services to the urban poor in the Dominican Republic, one
formulated and implemented by a government organization, and the
other by an NGO. In order to compare the government and the NGO
projects, I have formulated the following statement regarding the
nature of the government and non-government sectors. First,
since NGO are usually detached from government and market
interests (Turner, 1988), people see them as more credible and
trustworthy than government organizations. Therefore, I would
expect that the main advantage of NGOs is not only to coordinate
the activities of the bureaucracy and the urban poor but also to
help the latter to have access to the resources and services of
the former.
Second, since NGOs are not constrained by the bureaucratic
systems of government agencies (Anzorena, 19 ), I would expect
much more flexibility in the internal organization of an NGO than
in the case of a government institution. And since development
projects for the urban poor require flexible mechanisms for
implementation, I forecast that NGOs are likely to achieve their
stated objectives.
Third, since governments seem to be the more appropriate
choice for providing infrastructure and services such as water
7
supply, electric power, and health centers, I would expect that a
government organization would have a comparative advantage in
these kinds of intervention.
As explained before, these statements are explored with
respect to two projects, one a government project, the El Caliche
Project, and the other non-government, the Las Zurzas Project.
Both are located in the capital city of the Dominican Republic,
Santo Domingo. (In the context of this study, when I refer to
the "government project", I mean the El Caliche project; the
"non-government or NGO project" refers to the Las Zurzas
project).
Four characteristics shared by these two projects are
relevant to this comparison. First, both the government and the
non-government sectors were working on the same kind of
development projects for the delivering of services to the urban
poor: projects upgrading squatter settlements. These projects
consist of related interventions--the social organization of the
community, the provision of urban services, and the upgrading of
the housing--which seek to improve living and housing conditions
through physical works. Neither El Caliche nor Las Zurzas had
been served either by private sector or by conventional
government housing or infrastructure-providing programs.
Second, both organizations used the same kind of
intervention to improve living and housing conditions of the
urban poor--independent intervention such as implementing
programs for the upgrading of infrastructure, the improvement of
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housing, the construction of community facilities, and the
generation of income. I consider this intervention independent
because these organizations could modify or replace one element
without creating major disturbance in the functioning of the
others.
Third, both projects were implemented at almost the same
period. Therefore, they faced the same social, economic, and
political opportunities and./or constraints. And fourth both
organizations considered beneficiaries' participation as a
prerequisite for project implementation. My findings are
based, first, upon interviews I conducted during a visit to the
Dominican Republic for three weeks in January 1988. I
interviewed thirty people including project managers, field
staff, and beneficiaries of each project. In order to get a more
freely critical perception, I also met with people who had worked
in these projects for a period in the past and with observers who
were not directly involved. Furthermore, I have used, wherever
necessary, materials from office memos and project reports, as
well as my own work experience with NGOs, including the one in
question, in the Dominican Republic. Second, I relied upon a
review of government and NGO interventions into development
projects for the urban poor in the Third World in general, and in
Latin American and Caribbean countries in particular. In making
this review, I became conscious of the scarcity of literature
concerning NGOs in the shelter and human settlements field at the
urban level.
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I hope this study will contribute to the understanding of
the present and potential roles of NGOs and that it will identify
ways in which governments, NGOs and the urban poor can work
together in carrying out development projects.
This thesis is organized in four chapters. In the first
chapter, I describe my methodology and define the scope of the
present study. I continue with a description of the types of
government intervention directed to the problems of the urban
poor and a characterization of the activities of the non-
government sector in developing countries in general, and in the
Dominican Republic in particular.
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the comparative analysis
with a description of the problems of the two squatter
settlements--El Caliche and Las Zurzas--and the ways in which the
government and non-government organizations were addressing these
problems. Chapter 3 compares the issues of the beneficiary's
participation in terms of patterns of community organization,
voluntary labor, and leadership. I then contrast the performance
of each project based on an understanding of the sequences of
events that lead one organization to surpass another in
performance. Finally, the conclusion reviews my findings on the
roles of the government organizations and the NGOs in the
delivering of services for the urban poor, and raises some
questions about government and non-governmental organizations.
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1. METHODOLOGY
For this comparative study, I focused first on the origin
and objectives of each project; second, on the extent to which
the beneficiaries participate and volunteer to work in the
different components of each project; and third, on the
performance of both organizations in achieving its stated
objectives.
Beneficiaries' Participation and Voluntary Labor
The need for beneficiaries' participation is particularly
significant in poverty-oriented urban development projects.
Scholars in this field view participation as a fundamental right;
it improves the extent to which community development programs
meet the people's needs, and it raises their cense of commitment
to both the implementation and on-going use of a project. Active
community participation and a partnership between beneficiaries
and project implementors is crucial to the success of projects
upgrading squatter settlements. Therefore, I compared the
patterns of community organization and leadership implemented by
each organization.
Voluntary labor is an underlying assumption in poverty-
oriented projects so that beneficiaries are expected to
contribute their work in building communal facilities. I
identified if the beneficiaries of these projects volunteer to
work for the common good, and if so, in what kind of
interventions and why they did volunteer.
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Performance
I will measure the performance of these projects on the
basis of the achievement of the project's stated goals in their
different interventions; and on the effects of each project on
popular participation and access to government resources and
services. Performance will also be seen in terms of these
projects influence on policy and their potential to be replicated
by other organizations. Rather than comparing the final outcome
of each project in quantitative terms, I qualify and contrast the
sequence of events that each organization pursued to execute the
different components of each project. I assumed that this
process might reveal what kind of intervention worked and why;
and second, that knowing this I could identify the kinds of
intervention in which each organization had a comparative
advantage.
1.1 Government Organizations
Government intervention directed to the problems of the
urban poor can be grouped into three broad types of policies:
"being neglect"; "restrictive or preventive"; and "supportive".
A being neglect policies apply to the practice of some
governments officially ignoring the existence of squatter areas
and allocating public resources to other development sectors.
Restrictive or preventive policies involve efforts to eliminate
or reduce the size of low-income areas. In this case, "squatter
settlements are regarded as anomalous or pathological phenomena
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which ought to be suppressed or removed"(UNCHS, 1982). In
contrast to neglect and restrictive or preventive policies,
supportive policies seek to legalize squatter settlements,
improve existing structures, and provide assistance for self-help
housing. Sites-and-services schemes, squatter upgrading, and
aided self-help are examples of this kind of approach (CHEEMA,
1986).
In the Dominican Republic, as in the case of other
developing countries, the government has utilized a combination
of these three policies. The current administration, for
instance, which is especially concerned with "modernization" and
in making public works a visible symbol of government
achievements, has oriented its actions toward a restrictive
policy--the relocation of people from squatter settlements. But,
during the last year, the government has moved toward a
supportive police so that it is considering upgrading projects as
a palliative alternative to the problems of the increasing number
of people living in squatter settlements, at this time 65% of the
capital city population.
1.3 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Before explaining the NGOs programs and its actions directed
to the problems of the urban poor, it seems useful to define and
distinguish the different types of non-governmental
organizations. By non-governmental organization I mean any group
of people working together not for profit but with common and
13
agreed upon aims and objectives and doing so outside government
initiated and controlled projects (NGO New, 1984). The non-
governmental organizations include a wide variety of institutions
delivering different kind of services. These may include social-
service activities (running day-care centers, providing aid to
the needy, operating homes for destitute children and elderly);
human-capital formation agencies (education, vocational training,
and health care); and urban-service provision (dwelling
upgrading, building street, and sanitation facilities). Broadly
speaking, the non-governmental organizations delivering urban
services fall into two main categories: the first consists of
national, international, and local NGOs and informal groups that
are actively engaged in the improvement of shelter and human
settlements at urban or rural levels. The second main category
consists of housing corporations; institutions for housing
credit; trade unions of construction workers; a professional
associations of planners, architects, social workers; etc. Among
these main categories, I am primarily concerned on those non-
governmental organizations which are actively engaged in the
improvement of shelter and human settlements operating at the
urban level. In the case of the Dominican Republic, there are few
NGOs engaged in the improvement of shelter and human settlements
at the urban level. A 1985 directory, for instance, reports 140
NGOs operating in the country of which only one percent is
operating in the delivering of services in urban areas.
The basic actions of the NGOs engaged in the improvement of
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shelter and human settlements have been to supply urban services
for the poor, such as the installation of improved water
supplies; hygienic disposal of household and human wastes; and
the improvement of shelter (NGO news, 1984). This provision of
services by NGOs have occurred with or without interaction with
governments. Scholars such as Turner (1988), Berger and Neuhaus
(1977), and Anzorena (19 ), among others, argue that the
position and the role of NGOs in this field could change from
supplying services to supporting policies. The latter, they
argue, would entail (1) ensuring that government concerned are
aware of the options that people need, and (2) ensuring that the
poor are aware of their options and have access to the knowledge
and skill required to combine them into practical programs,
controlled or implemented by themselves.
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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
This section describes the common problems of the two
squatter settlements where the projects were implemented. Both
settlements are compared in terms of demographic, physical, and
economic variables. A list of their similarities comes first,
then their differences. This is followed by an analysis of the
origin and objectives of each project.
2.1 The Problem
According to the 1980 census, about 47% of the Dominican
Republic population's of 5.7 million people live in urban areas,
in cities of more than --- inhabitants. This percentage is
expected to increase to 75% in the year 2,000 (UCLA Latin America
Center, 1984). The capital city, Santo Domingo, accounts for 23%
of the country's total population, a share that is also expected
to increase to about 31% by 2000. In 1980, some 60% (179,000
households) of Santo Domingo's population lived in squatter
settlements, forming a center of misery on the northern periphery
of the capital city. Of this mass of squatter settlements, two
of them--El Caliche and Las Zurzas--which represent about 12% of
the total squatter population are the target of this study.
The settlements El Caliche and Las Zurzas are characterized
by a high population density, large family size, and poor
dwellings. Unsanitary conditions due to lack of adequate
infrastructure facilities and municipal services such as sewage,
garbage disposal, and flood control are prevalent in these areas.
Despite these features in common, they differ in the following
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demographic indicators. El Caliche has a population density of
1,075 persons/hectare; whereas, Las Zurzas reports a bigger
density, 1,151 persons/hectare. In both cases, these settlements
were growing faster (6.5% per annum) than their surrounding urban
areas (2.9% per year). Both squatter settlements are compared in
Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of demographic indicators in the squatter
settlements El Caliche and Las Zurzas
Demographic Indicators El Caliche Las Zurzas
total area 83,700 60,800 square meters
number of dwellings 1,197 1,250 dwellings
number of households 1,544 1,611 households
average persons/dwelling 7.25 5.6 persons
resident population 9,000 7,000 inhabitants
population density 1,075 1,151 person/hect.
Source: Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda. (1985) 1984 Annual
Report. Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana.
Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (1986)
Note: Since these statistic are of poor quality, the margin
of error is high and their veracity may be questioned.
The residents of these two settlements are, in general,
unskilled and poorly educated, and are unemployed or casually
employed in the informal sector. The unemployment rate of both
settlements is about 16 percent but, of those who are employed
34% of El Caliche's residents have jobs in the public or private
sector, whereas only 20% of Las Zurzas' residents do. The rest,
66% of El Caliche's and 80% of Las Zurzas' are engaged in small
businesses, primarily self-employed, which provide up to 50% of
the family unit's income. These businesses include carpenters,
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furniture-makers, food sellers, candy makers, street vendors,
bottle re-sellers, shoemakers, launders, and tailors. The median
income of El Caliche is lower than that of Las Zurzas. About 80%
of El Caliche's residents earn less than the minimum wage (RD$
175 or US$ 75 in 1982); whereas, some 70% of Las Zurzas'
residents are below the basic minimum. Regarding levels of
education, El Caliche and Las Zurzas have similar rates of
illiteracy: 20% and 23% respectively, but in Las Zurzas the
highest level of illiteracy is found in the population between
the ages of 5 and 24. In contrast, a small portion of El
Caliche's young population is at university.
Both settlements were formed during the early 1960's and
grew by accretion, with periods of rapid growth which reflect the
particular historical circumstances of the country. One event
that produced a fast growth in El Caliche, for instance, was the
effect of a hurricane in 1979. Hundreds of families lost their
housing and relocated to this settlement. The occupation of the
land in both settlements was illegal: a portion of El Caliche
belonged to the city administration and the rest by a state-owned
cement works; in the case of Las Zurzas, one portion was owned by
the government and the rest to one of the richest families in the
country. Although at that time, none of the landowners had
development plans for these areas, today the situation is
different. The current government began the construction of a
road which will go through both settlements.
About 40% of El Caliche's population and 47% of Las Zurzas'
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have lived in these areas for more than 15 years. The rest of El
Caliche's residents (60%) have lived in this settlement for 5 to
10 years; the remainder of Las Zurzas' (53%) has inhabited this
area for 2 to 5 years. Fifty eight percent of the El Caliche's
head of households, as opposed to sixty three in the Las Zurzas,
are homeowners. The rest, 42% of El Caliche's head of households
and 37% of Las Zurzas', are renters.
Both, El Caliche and Las Zurzas, are located in a
topographically difficult and hazardous terrain, but their
physical conditions differ in that Las Zurzas is split by a
contaminated ravine through which runs an contaminated river.
This river is composed not only of the sewage and drainage
systems of the northern part of the city and the waste-disposal
of 54 industries there, but also of the solid waste of Las
Zurzas' residents. At the end of this flow of contamination,
there is a natural river which empties into the Caribbean Sea.
At the city level, this polluted ravine is a focus of
contamination which demands the attention of the government. At
the community level, it is the origin of many problems among Las
Zurzas' residents: diseases, floods, and landslides during the
rainy season. The land-slides threaten 63% of the existing
housing which is already in ramshackle condition. Moreover,
since this ravine divides the Las Zurzas' irregular pathway and
street network that connects this settlement with the main urban
system in this area, it presents a severe safety challenge for
the children and adults who inhabit Las Zurzas.
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As Janice Perlman points out in one of her studies
about the "favelas" in Brazil (1986), there are social, economic,
and political structures in these settlements. The better off
and older residents of El Caliche live on the level ground where
a local association built a structure used currently as a school.
The poorest residents and the newcomers live in the hills; here
these people organized a communal society to improve the paths,
sidewalks, and water supply system. Both organizations foundered
for lack of funds. The El Caliche residents also organized
religious, political, cultural and sports associations in which
more than 50% of the heads of families participated.
In the case of Las Zurzas, the poorest squatters live in the
area surrounding the ravine, while the better-off inhabit the
"Parte Alta" (the High Part). Sixty five percent of those living
in the area surrounded by the ravine want to leave the
neighborhood, but the rest (35%) want to remain. This decision
to move or to stay has been a source of conflict among Las
Zurzas' residents; a conflict that is worsening since the current
government announced the construction of a road which will
interrupt this settlement by either forcing people to move to
government's housing in the suburban areas or giving them
compensation in cash. As a result, two opposing groups have
emerged: one in favor of relocation and the other against it.
Those in favor of relocation are the families living in the area
surrounding the ravine who are primarily renters. For these
people, relocation is an opportunity to get their own housing
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from the government. Those against relocation--people living in
better area and primarily homeowners--feel that the government
will relocate them in "barrancones" (transitional housing) first,
and that they will live there for ever without owning another
housing. Although this conflict of interests exist, several
associations continue their activities in the area, incorporating
people from both sides and from the High Part such as "Junta de
Vecinos", parents associations, religious organizations,
political groups, and cultural and sports clubs.
In sum, the need for urban services--for everything from
water to schools and recreation is the common problem of these
settlements. For las Zurzas' residents, in addition, the main
priority is to build pathways across the "polluted ravine" in
order to improve the physical and health environmental
conditions. Committees exist in both settlements in order to
work in common activities improving the quality of life, but
there is not a single committee to work in the interest of
everybody, the poorest and the better off, in each settlement.
2.2 The Origin and Objectives of each Project
The genesis of the El Caliche and the Las Zurzas projects
was not founded in the immediate needs of these squatters or the
social, economic, and political pressures put upon them, but in
the institutional goals of the government organization, the
National Housing Office (INVI), and the non-governmental
organizations, the Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral
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(IDDI).
The National Housing Office, a government agency organized
within the President's Office, chose the squatter settlement El
Caliche to implement a development project for upgrading squatter
settlements because El Caliche met several of the criteria
required for the international organization which would fund
about fifty percent of this project. These criteria included: a
limit on the number of households participating to about 1,000;
government ownership of the parcel as opposed to private; and a
settlement with existing agreed upon boundaries. The government
staff assumed that if the government organization implemented a
project in a community of around 1,000 households, this project
would permit a flexible administration and would avoid
bureaucratic mechanisms in the implementation process.
The Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (IDDI), the
first NGO in the country engaged in the field of shelter and
human settlements at the urban level (see origin of this
institution in Appendix A), selected Las Zurzas because this NGO
was interested in developing a guideline for the implementation
of upgrading development projects at the urban level. The IDDI's
committee of directors assumed that non-government organizations
will use this guideline for implementing development projects for
the urban poor.
At the institutional level, the objectives of the government
and non-government project nearly coincided. Both organizations
wanted to create a "model project" for a upgrading squatter
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settlement. This model was expected to be replicated by
government agencies in one case and by a non-governmental
organization in the other. Replicability thus was a common
concern. At the community level, the objective of both projects
were to enhance the urban, social, and economic conditions of El
Caliche and Las Zurzas--l,544 and 1,611 households, respectively.
To achieve this objective, both projects agreed upon the
following interventions (detailed below): the social organization
of the community, the improvement of housing, the creation of
community facilities, the upgrading of infrastructure, and the
distribution of loans for income generation programs. For the
community organization intervention, both organizations assumed
that the incorporation of popular participation in the
improvement of these squatter settlements would produce better
project results. To this end, both institutions organized the
residents of these communities in a neighborhood organization
designed to encourage people's participate in the solution of
their own problems.
The infrastructure program, in both projects, included the
construction of streets, paths and sidewalks; the extension of
the existing water-supply network; the installation of sewage and
waste-water disposal; and the improvement of the existing
electrical system. The communal facilities program included the
construction of a school and recreational facilities, but in the
government project the construction of a health-care center was
also planned. To improve housing, the government organization
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planned to upgrade 500 units in the first stage (1982-1985) and
more than 600 units in the next decade. The government staff
distributed loans between RD$ 300 (US$ 120)1 and RD$ 1,000 (US$
400) for building materials; the heads of families then had the
responsibility of contracting the required labor force and
upgrading their own housing. The non-government organization
addressed the improvement of housing without a defined strategy
regarding the number of units to be upgraded per period of time.
NGO's staff also distributed loans between RD$ 300 (US$ 120) and
RD$ 1,000 (US$ 400). Both projects also considered a revolving
fund with credits for small scale businesses.
The differences between both projects' interventions were
first, the government project addressed land tenure issues;
whereas the NGO project did not because as a non-governmental
organization the institution did not have the right to handle
land legal issues. Moreover, handling with this legal issues
would occupy a great deal of time which otherwise could be spend
for physical interventions as suppose to land status. The
government project included the allocation of land under a lease
system for 15 years which would allow security of tenure for the
squatters, but reserved the property rights to the government.
The second difference was that the NGO project addressed the
concern about environmental conditions. The NGO proposed to
cover the polluted ravine described in section 2.1 and build a
1 US$ 1 = RD$ 2.5 at the official exchange rate, 1982.
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community center over it. This community center would include a
recreation area, a health-care center, a school, and laundry
areas. This organization thus took on a major environmental
problem of primary concern to the settlers, whereas the
government organization did not.
Both projects also differed in strategies each organization
used to implement the different programs. Regarding the
community organization program, the government project included
the whole community in its proposal: the people living on the
Hill (the poorest) and the people living on Level Ground (the
better off). In contrast, the NGO project's approach worked with
the poorest residents first. To this end, NGO's staff began
working with only one portion of the community, those living
closer to the polluted ravine (the poorest); after three years
then the project included those living in the High Part (the
better off). Another difference was that the government project
assigned administrative responsibilities such as the
administration of revolving funds and the accounting and
budgeting activities of upgrading the housing and the income
generation programs to El Caliche's government organization
created. In contrast, the NGO project did not assigned
administrative responsibilities to the community.
Regarding economic resources, both organizations dealt with
different amount of money. The governmental organization
allocated RD$ 1,330,500 (US$ 532,200) for its project. The
Dominican Government through the National Housing Office financed
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51% of this total amount, and the German Society for Technical
Cooperation, an international aid agency, granted the rest (49%).
The government organization's investment in this project
represented a very small percentage of the National Housing
Office's annual budget. In 1984, the budget for El Caliche's
project represented less than one percent (RD$ 112,000 =
US$44,800) of the National Housing Office's budget of
RD$31,610,000 (US$ 12,644,000).
The NGO allocated RD$ 900,000 (US$ 360,000) for its project.
Seven different international agencies financed this project, the
Dominican Government only contributed with permissions, donations
(building materials), and technical assistance. In contrast, the
NGO project absorbed more than eighty five percent of the NGO's
annual budget, while it allocated the rest (15%) for a housing
project in a suburban area close to the capital city and for
income generation programs in other squatter settlements in the
capital city.
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Table 2. The GOVERNMENT Project vs. the NGO Project
................................................................................................................
Project Target Population Time Frame Sources of Fund Services Offered Staff Implemented Agencies
................................................................................................................
Gov't 9,000 inhabitants 1982 to Dominican Gv't Community Organiz. Social Workers National Housing Office
or 1,544 households present International Upgrading Infrast. Engineers Ministry of Education
Budget
RD$ 1 330 500*
(US 532,2O0)
NGO 7,000 inhabitants 1984 to
or 1,250 households present
Budget
RD% 900 000*
(USS 366,000)
International
-DESWOS***
-FIA***
-USAID***
-CEBEMO***
-MISEREOR***
-ZENTRALSTELLE*
-ACTION
Community Facilities Architects Neighborhood Org.
Housing Upgrading** Accounter FDD***
Income Generation** CARITAS***
INFOTEC***
CDE***
Internat. Consultants
Community Organiz.
Upgrading infrast.
Community Facilities
Housing Upgrading**
Income Generation**
Social Workers
Enginneers
Architects
Accounter
IDDI***
Neighbhorhood Org.
Notes: * US% 1.00 = RD$ 2.50 at the official exchange rate, 1982
** (A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
The government organization planned to upgrade 500 units in the first stage (1982-1985) and
more than 600 units in the next decade.
The NGO addressed the improvement of housing without a defined strategy regarding the number
of units to be upgraded per riod of time.
The goverment income generation program was about RD$ 60 000 (US$ 24 000).
The NGO project income generation program was about RD$ 7,000 (US$ 10,800).
** FIA (InterAmerican Foundation).
USAID (United Stated Agency for International Development).
FDD (Fundacion Dominicana de Desarrollo).
INFOTEC (Instituto Nacional de Capacitacion Tecnica).
CDE (Compania Dominicana de Electricidad).
ID0 (Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral).
3. The GOVERNMENT Project vs the NGO Proiect
The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the project
formulated and implemented by the government organization--
Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda--with that of the NGO--
Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral. I contrast them, as
described earlier, in terms of kinds of community organizations
and leadership approaches; on the extent to which the
beneficiaries participate and volunteer to work in the different
project's components; and in terms of the performance of each
project in achieving each of its stated interventions.
3.1 Participation
In the literature of poverty-oriented projects, scholars and
practitioners have focused on ways to involve the poor in the
improvement of their lives by getting them to participate
actively in development projects. Community participation
through a variety of community organizations and different kinds
of leadership have been key issues of concern. What kinds of
community organizations, decision-making processes, and
leadership approaches did the government and non-government
projects use? How were they different? In what degree did these
differences lead one organization to have a comparative advantage
over another in achieving the components of these projects?
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(A) Local-elite decision making vs. Top-down "Sensitive"
Approaches
To organize the community, both organizations used
variations of the local-elite decision making and top-down
"sensitive" approaches. The government used a hybrid of the top-
down and local-elite decision making approaches, in which the
poor have some power over decisions; whereas the NGO applied what
Judith Tendler calls a top-down "sensitive" approach. This
approach applies to community involvement that is top-down and
based on sensitive consultation and interaction with those
affected in the project (Tendler, 1982). How has each
institution proceeded to set up the local organizations necessary
for the implementation of each project?
In the government project, a team composed of three social
workers organized the community into a neighborhood organization
including the both sectors in which El Caliche is economically
and socially divided into--the Hill and the Flat Ground, as
addressed earlier, an organization that represented the whole
interests of the communities did not exist in El Caliche. The
supreme hierarchy of this organization was a general assembly,
followed by a board of directors, and several committees such as
those on employment, credit, and waste collection and sewerage.
The general assembly was made up of five representatives of
each of the 32 family groups into which the social workers
divided El Caliche. This division was based on physical and
natural boundaries. This assembly, 160 members in total, met
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every three months, with 15 days advance notice before
convocation. The board of directors was composed of one delegate
from each of the 11 areas in which the 32 family groups were
located, and met at least every fifteen days.
This organization was officially registered as a non-profit
legal entity with the power to represent all the families of the
project area, as stated in a 1984 report by the government
agency. The responsibilities of this legal entity were, among
others, to administer the project--the revolving credit fund and
ensure its repayment--and to coordinate with the government
agency the activities of other sectoral organizations involved in
the project such as the organization in charge of the income-
generation component and the one that ran the health program. I
will comment on the implications of this division of labor in a
later section of this chapter.
The first members elected to the general assembly and the
board of directors were the existing leaders and members of the
local elites. The reasons were: First, in El Caliche, as
addressed in a previous chapter, there were groups and
organizations with different interests, but not an organization
that represented the whole community interests. Moreover, many
of the representatives were not known by El Caliche's poorest
residents nor were they inhabitants of the "Hill" area, who were
the poorest, newcomers, and primarily renters. Second, the
social workers began the project holding meetings and discussions
with indigenous leaders and local elites like school-teachers,
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religious groups, and the more educated. On the one hand, these
discussions were useful in getting the project started in the
first phase; on the other hand, the fact that the social workers
contacted the local elite first motivated their election as the
main members of the neighborhood organization.
As a result, this created organization represented, in many
instances, the local elites' interests rather than those of the
whole community. In the majority of the cases, this created
neighborhood organization represented the homeowners, better off,
and long-time residents; whereas the interests of the renters,
the poorest, and short-term residents were seldom reflected.
Only in a few cases when a problem or a specific situation was
affecting everybody, the neighborhood organization represented
the interests of the whole community and was the channel of
communication between El Caliche's inhabitants and the government
decision-makers. That was the case during the substitution of
the "legal" electrical system for the existing one. The
government pointed out that all beneficiaries had to pay for the
new legal electrical system, but the community refused to pay for
it: "If we need to pay for the new electrical system, we do not
want it. We aren't going to pay for it". Since people were
using electrical power without any payment--the illegal
electrical system--they appealed to the neighborhood
organization. As a result, the government decided to subsidize
the new legal electrical system because government officials want
to keep the project going in the eyes of the international agency
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financing 50% of this project. Though there was not a full
representation of the whole community's interests within the
elected members of the neighborhood organization, in some
instances when the interests of poor and rich were the same, this
organization facilitated the resolution of problems affecting
both groups.
In the case of the NGO project, the community was organized,
as addresed earlier, using the top-down "sensitive" approach.
The sequence of events that took place in Las Zurzas was as
follows: First, the NGO field staff (two social workers)
contacted indigenous organizations such as La Junta de Vecina,
the Parents Associations, Undertaker Associations, and religious
groups as well. They visited each family of the project area and
explained to them the kind of project that would be implemented
in the neighborhood. The social workers proceeded to divide the
community into sections according to natural spatial division,
and to select one coordinator per group. Next, they held a
meeting with the coordinator of each of the sectors created and
with representatives of indigenous organizations. The main issue
in the agenda was Las Zurzas' contaminated ravine and how the
project would address this problem. As a result of this meeting,
the NGO's staff and the people elected a council committee
composed of eight persons. They elected the natural leaders and
the better off living in the area surrounding the ravine--
homeowners, lenders, owners of small grocery shops (los duefios de
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los colmados), and local political leaders.
The natural leaders and local elite dominated the elected
council committee, though the social workers of the non-
governmental organization consulted and interacted with both the
poorest and the better-off families of the area surrounding the
ravine. These leaders, as in the case of the government project,
were not necessarily acting on behalf of the community, nor
making decisions in the best interest of all the residents. To
illustrate, in the upgrading of streets and pathways the members
of the council committee were specially concerned with improving
first those streets that connected to their housing rather than
the ones bringing services to the majority of the people. Since
the council committee involved enlightened control by the NGO
staff along with control of decisions by the local elite, this
organization could not be defined as literally participatory as
might be hoped normally in development projects for the poor
implemented by NGOs.
(B) Paid "Volunteers"
Voluntary labor and participation in the construction of
community services and facilities occurred in both projects,
however it was not literally voluntary. Where the number of
homeowners were prevalent, voluntary laborers participated and
"volunteered" to work in short-term interventions and in
activities in which they received compensation for their work, in
kind or in cash. People also "volunteered" to work in
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interventions in which they would be excluded from the benefit of
the activity in question if they did not participate in it, for
instance, in the connection of the water system to beneficiaries'
housing.
In the government project, the mobilization of people to
participate was easier in short-term interventions that benefited
a huge amount of people than in long-term activities that did not
give them immediate benefit. The construction of streets, paths
and sidewalks was successful in terms of people's participation,
whereas participation in the construction of the school and
health center was not. The latter required several months of
intensive construction work, whereas the former demanded several
weekends of labor. Furthermore, workers were not participating as
actively as was hoped in the construction of long-term
structures, because they were resentful that some workers were
paid to work whereas they, the unskilled, were not. Active
participation was also achieved in the installation of a running-
water system because those who did not "volunteer" to work would
lose the right to connect the water system to their housing.
In the NGO project, participation also depended upon the
kind of benefits people received. Voluntary labor was more
easily forthcoming when food was offered in exchange for work.
The construction of pathways and sidewalks was possible because
the NGO provided food in exchange for labor. Social workers
opened small accounts at several grocery shops in which the
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"voluntary" laborers could acquire food, drinks, and cigarettes.
This finding coincides with the findings of other scholars, e.g.
Judith Tendler and Estelle James, and with my field experience in
rural development projects. The construction of housing in a
rural village was increased dramatically when the social workers
prepared food not only for the construction workers, but also for
the women and the children who carried water out to the
construction works.
When participation determines which people will be eligible
to receive project benefits, more voluntary labor was also
forthcoming. To illustrate, social workers provided the first
opportunity for the project's benefits to those who participated
hardest in the construction works, for instance, they were the
first to be granted credit. In the case that I found truly
"voluntary" participation was because of the commitment of the
NGO' field staff. The level of interaction of engineers and
social workers not only in the construction works, but also in
the common life of the squatters developed a tight relationship
between residents and technicians. This relationship of
affection provoked that the squatters participated voluntary in
the construction works, but just in certain cases.
In both projects, social workers devoted time and energy to
explain in the neighborhood organization's meetings the
importance of working in voluntary participatory activities for
the community as a whole. But none of the participatory
activities were truly voluntary: this empirical evidence shows
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that people participate and contribute their time for the common
good when they are rewarded with benefits in cash or in kind.
(C) Pattern of Leadership
Different patterns of leadership evolved in each of these
projects, ranging from traditional and paternalistic to young and
formally educated leadership. In the government project two
types of leaders emerged: the traditional leaders and the young
and "challenging" leaders. In the NGO project the traditional
leaders were more common, but currently a version of the
challenging leaders is appearing. Why did these different
patterns of leadership exist?
In the government project although tha first two elections
of the neighborhood organization went to traditional leaders,
after that a new type of leader arose. The traditional leaders
were people in the age between 40 and 60 years who derived their
support on the basis of traditional, authoritarian, and
paternalistic values. In contrast, the new leaders in their late
20s and early 30s belonged to a young generation of squatters and
had a higher educational level. Coming from a younger and better
educated generation, their allegiance to traditional leaders was
weak. They appealed to a different constituency, one which cut
across older social and cultural divisions; they were challenging
not only the established leaders in the area, but also the
"paternalistic" mechanisms used by the government and the
international organizations in the project. These new leaders
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questioned, for instance, the performance of government staff and
of the international consultants in the community activities.
Furthermore, since they had a greater ability to negotiate with
external factors than the traditional leaders, the new leaders
were the ones who primarily participated in the negotiation
process with the government officials who were in charge of the
relocation of those residents of El Caliche who were affected by
the current administration's construction programs.
In sum, both types of leaders coexisted, each having
authority and influence in different sectors of the community.
The traditional leaders helped to mobilize people for communal
activities, while the new leaders served as links with the
government staff--they were more educated and more familiar with
administrative requirements. These new leaders were and are
helping the squatters to create a channel of communication
between the government officials and the neighborhood
organization in which people can express their needs and concerns
regarding their own settlement, while the old leaders still
reflected traditional and indigenous sources of authority and
decision.
In the NGO project these changes in patterns of leadership
took place at another level. As addressed in a previous chapter,
the NGO project began in the poorest area, the one surrounding
the "polluted ravine", whose residents had a low educational
level. Since low educational levels often go hand in hand with
36
lower interest to take high responsibilities in community issues
at first young and educated leaders did not emerge as they did in
the government project. But at the time of my field research,
because the NGO was including in the project the better off
residents (those living in the "High Part") a new kind of leaders
began to emerge. These new leaders in their late 20s and early
30s as in the case of the government project, included not only
the young and educated men but women as well. This was a
departure, for women had not been included in the first
neighborhood committee.
As a result of this experience, the non-governmental
organization began to hire some of these leaders and to give them
important project responsibilities. Two of the NGO's social
workers were residents of the "High Part" of Las Zurzas and one
of them was in charge of the social programs of the project.
Furthermore, since these leaders had credentials in the
neighborhood because of the skills they had acquired through
education and since they were acquainted with the residents, they
were able to identify those residents who were active in
improving the community. Their strategy, therefore, was to
propose these people as candidates for the next neighborhood
community election, rather than the leaders who hold their
positions as result of their status in the community as--
lenders, owners of small grocery shops, homeowners and so forth.
This finding reveals that young leaders with higher
educational levels are important sources of leadership and bring
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skills and experience relevant to community development programs.
They can also create a channel of communication between the
implemented organization and the community as well as between
other government agencies and the community. Furthermore, since
new leaders emerged when the project included the better-off
residents this finding may attract attention from government and
non-government organizations when they select a target population
in their development projects.
3.2 Performance
(A) Narrow vs Wide Trade
There is one aspect of the involvement of government and
non-government organizations that stands out. This is their
contrasting "trade-oriented" approach: the government
organization used a narrow-trade approach, whereas the NGO
applied a wide-trade approach.
The government organization took responsibility for some
intervention, while the rest of the components were taken over by
other public and non-public agencies. The National Housing
Office limited its responsibilities to the execution and
supervision of the infrastructure work, housing upgrading and
community facilities structures. It also coordinated the actions
of the neighborhood organization with the activities of other
institutions assisting other project's components. The
educational programs were assisted by a government organization,
the Ministry of Education; whereas the income generation programs
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were backed by a non-governmental organization, the Fundacion
Dominicana de Desarrollo.
In contrast, the NGO took responsibility for all the
components of the project: the improvement of infrastructure, the
upgrading of housing, the income generation programs, the
construction of community facilities, and the problem of the
"polluted ravine" as well. The NGO was working on many things at
the same time which limited its ability to perform well.
As a result of these contrasting tendencies, the government
project finished the construction of streets, paths and
sidewalks, the extension of water-supply network, and the
improvement of the existing electrical system; whereas the NGO
could not achieve its expected performance in the "polluted
ravine" problems--the first priority of Las Zurzas' residents as
explained earlier in section 2.2--or in the majority of the other
components. Surprisingly, a good performance was achieved in the
cases that the NGO oriented toward a "specific-trade" approach.
These were the cases in which the NGO implementors devoted time
to analyze and understand "specific" activities. In the income
generation program, for instance, the NGO used two different
approaches: the reinforcement of the existing small enterprises
and the creation of new ones. In the first approach, the NGO's
staff identified the indigenous small enterprises, learned about
their production processes, sources of supply, product markets,
and industry structure. The social workers identified around 18
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different small enterprises-- food preparers, vegetable vendors,
tailors, shoe-makers, etc. Then, they selected some of these
enterprises and provided credit and technical assistance. This
was the case with the association of "Tricicleros" (vegetable
vendors) created by the NGO. The social workers figured out that
about thirty percent of the male population was employed in this
activity and they had to make regular payments for the rental of
their "triciclos" (bicycles). Although one might think that a
bicycle is not expensive, none of the squatters had enough
savings nor credit to buy one. The NGO created a simple system on
which people could rent the bicycles with the option of owning
them after one year of payment. With this system, people had
access to credit and the opportunity not only to invest in their
own business but also to increase productivity.
But when the NGO was creating new enterprises its
performance was not as good. An illustration is their effort to
establish a sewing workshop. This required a higher capital
investment than was required to reinforce existing small
enterprises such as the "Tricicleros" Association. It also
required a specialized labor force, an understanding of a new
enterprise structure, and a search for demand. The NGO invested
a huge amount of time training women and economic resources in
order to buy the required machines. They invested human capital
for they had to learn the accounting and financial systems
required for this kind of business first themselves and then
teach these systems to the people. Despite this investment of
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economic and human capital, the sewing workshop is now closed:
the demand was scarce and the administrative and financial
systems were deficient.
Working with indigenous small enterprises allowed a better
performance than the creation of new ones because squatters
themselves had a clear understanding of the production processes,
sources of supply, product markets, and industry structure.
In sum, the government agency achieved a good performance
when it limited its responsibilities, whereas the opposite was
true for the NGO. The NGO was doing too much at the same time.
Why did the government organization put limitation on itself
while the NGO did not? My finding was that the government
organization limited itself not just because of a lack of
economic resources but because of according to law the
responsibility of the National Housing Office is to provide
housing not to create jobs, implement educational training, or
establish health-care programs. Since there were other
government organizations which were experienced in these fields,
the National Housing Office limited its action to its area of
expertise.
In contrast, the responsibility of the non-governmental
organization seemed ambiguous not only to outside observers but
also to their own staff. The NGO wanted to resolve all the
people's needs without taking into account its economic and
technical capacities. The point I am making is not that the
government organization in question is better than the NGO, but
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that any kind of organizations must recognize its institutional
limits. How can the NGO resolve an environmental problem-- the
polluted ravine -- if it does not have economic resources or
expertise in the field? Why did not the NGO point out this
problem to the government and the squatters? Why did not it
motivate the squatters ask for government resources? Furthermore,
what happened when the NGO did not achieve its stated objectives
in the eyes of the Las Zurzas' residents?
(B) Credibility vs. Lack of Confidence
During its first two years the NGO project enjoyed greater
credibility among the squatters than did the government project,
but when the NGO did not achieve its stated objectives this began
to change. The NGO had promised that the ravine would be covered
and it was not; neither was a promise to finish the construction
of a half-built primary school.
I found that the lack of confidence in the government
project was the result of (1) false promises made by local
politicians in the past; (2) the period in which the project
began to be implemented--just before the national election; and
(3) delays in the beginning of the project. In the first phase
of the government project, the presence of an international
agency counteracted the squatters' lack of confidence in
government organizations. Since the international agency was
eager to replicate this project's experience in other developing
countries, short-term consultants from Germany remained in the
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country giving advice and training not only to government's field
staff but also to the members of the neighborhood organization
and beneficiaries in general. And since Dominican people are
inclined to believe that foreign is synonymous with "good"
because of cultural and traditional beliefs (what I call the
"myth of foreignness"), the presence of these foreign consultants
and of an organization outside government interests increased the
people's interests in the project and their willingness to
participate in the different components during the first months
of the project implementation. This confidence evaporated when
the new young generation of leaders emerged, as explained in
section 3.lc, and when neither the government organization nor
the international agency accomplished its stated objectives on
time: the project began almost one year late and its components
were not finished as expected. The point I making here is that
when the government and non-government organizations did not
achieve its stated objectives in the eyes of the community, they
lacked credibility from the people. Furthermore, when the NGO
did not achieve its stated promises, it lost one of its potential
quality; people saw them as most trustworthy than government
organizations.
(C) Flexible vs Rigid Mechanisms
The upgrading projects for the urban poor require special
configuration of the organization involved. Administrative
flexibility in the application of the operational criteria is
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necessary if the system may respond effectively to the needs of
low- and unstable -income families (Vernez, 1976). This
requirement suggests the need for decentralization of the savings
and loan administrative mechanics at the community level and
flexible mechanics at the institutional level.
Contrary to expectations, the governmental organization
tried to create flexible mechanisms for the execution of the El
Caliche project, while the NGO established "rigid" and, in
certain instances, bureaucratic systems. Why did the NGO
institute "rigid" systems at the implementation level, while the
government organization tried to avoid them?
The government organization, as addressed in section 2.2,
decided to choose a community of about 1,000 households because
this would allow flexible administration and would avoid
bureaucratic mechanisms in the implementation process. The
organization, therefore, was trying to decentralize the
administrative and financial mechanisms that were constrained the
implementation process of its other projects. To this end,
government's staff opened a cash account for contingencies such
as building materials, transportation, and paid labor force at
the community level which the social workers and members of the
community organization were able to control. Furthermore, at the
institutional level, the National Housing Office assigned to a
group of technicians the main project's responsibilities in order
to avoid delate in the decision-making process.
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In the non-government organization, since donors were
constantly pressured to come up with something visible right away
and since the NGO project was financed by several international
agencies, these posed constraints in the NGO project. The NGO's
office staff were aware of donors' periodical accounting,
therefore they introduced "rigid" administrative and financial
mechanisms and unfortunately, the NGO's field staff
underestimated the implications of these mechanisms at the
implementation level. In one of my meetings with the NGO field
staff, the project manager and the social workers argued that one
of the biggest problems facing the project was the delay
resulting from administrative problems: "If we need to buy
something or pay someone, we must wait for more than one week.
We must wait until at least three of the members of board of
directors sign out the permission". Regarding the loan
administrative mechanisms, the person in charge of the housing
upgrading component pointed out: "the administrative requirements
are very complicated. It takes a great amount of time. We must
fill out about fourteen questionnaires just to lend people RD$
300 [US$ 100]2.11 These findings reveal a lack of understanding
of the administrative and financial mechanisms required for the
implementation of development projects for the poor. Since this
lack of understanding induced the creation of rigid mechanisms in
the NGO project's implementation process; and since the
literature often refers NGOs, as opposed to government agencies,
2 US$ 1.00 = RD$ 3.00 at the official exchange rate, 1986.
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as organizations with flexible mechanisms of implementation, this
empirical evidence is a counter intuitive finding.
(E) Invisible Achievements
Since government organizations were concerned about visible
outcomes that helped government officials to get reelected, the
National Housing Office was interested in visible project
results. In contrast, the non-governmental organization was
concerned about the implementation process through which people
learn to gain control over their lives. A government official
argued, "we invested around two years in organizing the El
Caliche neighborhood, but we achieved physical improvements which
are not quite visible in this settlement (this refers to
extension of the existing water-supply network, the improvement
of the existing electrical system, and the construction of
streets, paths, and sidewalks). We need more visible outcomes".
Because of this lack of visible achievement during the first
stages of this project, the government agency is changing its
approach toward providing services to the urban poor. Currently,
the government is not investing time in organizing a community,
but is going there to inform the people about the resources that
this government agency is able to invest in such neighborhoods.
People then have the responsibility of organizing themselves in
order to gain access to government resources. Another change of
attitude is that government officials recognize the need of
giving people an incentive in cash or in kind to participate in
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the delivering of services.
Although the non-governmental organization was being
pressured by some donor agencies to achieve a visible outcome,
the NGO staff invested its time in the slow process of organizing
the community and in inducing changes in the decision-making
process in the neighborhood committee. As explained in section
3.1c, the non-government organization took time to hire new
leaders, gave them important project responsibilities, and induce
those people who were active in the community to join the
neighborhood committee.
If the government organization were to formulate its
projects under the assumption that communities will organize
themselves, what might happen to those communities which do not
have the capacity to organize themselves? Might the role of non-
governmental organizations in the delivery of services then be
both to assist the urban poor in organizing themselves and to
help then obtain access to the government's resources and
services?
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4. CONCLUSION
Although all the questions posed in this comparative study
of government and of non-government interventions in the
provision of services to the urban poor, could not be answered
within the limits of this thesis, my findings lead to the
following four conclusions:
(1) this study reveals that when NGOs take
responsibility for providing large scale services, they
themselves might constrain their potential roles. My findings
show that the NGO in question limited its potential role by: (i)
overestimating its own economic and technical capacity to resolve
people's needs, (ii) involving the organization in activities
outside its field of expertise, (iii) lacking an understanding of
the required mechanisms to implement development projects for the
poor, and (iv) losing its credibility with the people when it did
not accomplish its stated goals.
If human and financial resources are mobilized and used to
achieve societal goals through government and non-government
organizations, their institutional capacities become critical in
development projects. The non-governmental organization was very
ambitious: its project was formulated without its recognizing of
its own institutional capacity. The NGO was involved in many
activities and took on difficult tasks; its commitment to
resolving the people's problems some what overtaxed its economic
and technical capacity. Moreover, since in the eyes of the
community it had not achieved its stated objective, it lost an
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important quality compared to the government organizations: its
credibility. The people saw NGO's as more believable and
trustworthy than government organizations.
Surprisingly, the presence of an international non-
governmental organization in the government project changed
people's perception of that government. Although both
organizations, the government and international agencies, also
lost credibility because of their inability to meet their
established deadlines, the presence of the International NGO
helped to show that the government organization was seeking to
upgrade people's lives, and not considering only the political
benefit.
(2) a second conclusion is that in poverty-oriented projects
participation is more forthcoming, and people are more likely to
contribute their time for the common good when they are granted
benefits in kind or in cash.
(3) this study also shows that different kinds of leadership
may bring experience and skills relevant to development programs.
For instance, the coexistence of traditional and challenging
leaders as addressed in this study may lead to the creation of a
channel of communication not only between the implemented
organization and the community but also between other government
agencies and the community.
(4) finally, the need of governments in developing countries
for visible achievement may lead government organizations to
formulate their development projects for the urban poor under the
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assumption that communities will organize themselves to have
access to government' resources. In this case, the question
arises: might not the role of NGOs in development projects for
the poor be simply to assist people to organize themselves and to
help the poor gain access to government services and resources?
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6. APPENDIX A: The Origin of the Instituto Dominicano de
Desarrolo Integral (IDDI)
The Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (IDDI) had
its roots in another non-government organization, the Inter-
Institutional Housing Council (CII-VIVIENDA). CII-VIVIENDA began
as a result of a natural disaster. At the end of August 1979,
the Dominican Republic was hit by the most devastating hurricane
the Caribbean had seen in more than a century. This hurricane
brought new urgency to the chronic shortage of adequate housing
in the Dominican Republic. As the island's residents undertook
the clean-up got underway, representatives of several public and
private organizations met informally to share ideas and plan new
lines of attack to cope with the situation. This group decided
to form a non-governmental organization, CII-VIVIENDA, in which
government officials had decision-making power. These people
kept working as a consolidated organization for four years until
a change of government administration arrived. Since the
government influenced the NGO's board of directors decision-
making process, this change of administration caused abrupt
transformations in the structure of this institution. As a
result, about seventy percent of the technical and administrative
staff left this non-governmental organization. One year later in
1984, these professionals with experience in non-government
organizations created the Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo
Integral. This new NGO, obviously, emerged without any
participation from government organizations in its decision-
54
making process. The contribution of the government was only in
materials and permissions. This new institution, IDDI, focused
its attention in urban areas, rather than concentrated its
activities in the rural areas. Why did this NGO work in urban
areas rather than in rural areas? Two reasons motivated this
change: the first was social-political movements that had their
major roots in the squatter settlements of the capital city. In
April 1984, as the Dominican Government began to implement
another round of "adjustments" demanded by the International
Monetary Fund, hundreds of squatters participated in a
demonstration against these adjustments. At least a hundred
protesters were killed, several hundred were wounded, and more
that 1,000 were arrested. Since the majority of the
demonstrations came from squatter settlements, this alerted the
attention of local and international authorities. This attention
made easier for IDDI to work in squatter settlements at the urban
level because the institution could channel international funds
rapidly and obtain more credibility from local authorities even
though it was still in its first year of operation. The second
reason was that working in the capital city the organization
could contact local elites and powerful persons easily;
furthermore, the institution would spend less on vehicles'
operation not only for its field staff, but also for current and
potential donors and visitors from international aid agencies.
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